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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. • 
Karl Grant Losee, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) Case No. 20080650-CA 
1 Appeal 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE OF MR. LOSEE'S EARLIER CRIMES WAS 
NOT PROPERLY ADMITTED FOR CONTEXTUAL, 
MOTIVATIONAL OR REBUTTAL PURPOSES. 
Allowing the jury to hear the spectacularly horrifying details of Mr. 
Losee's prior aggravated assault and aggravated burglary involving Becky 
Underwood ("Ms. Underwood") was overwhelmingly unfair to Appellant 
Karl Losee ("Mr. Losee" or "Appellant"). The Rules of Evidence seek to 
exclude just such details because those details provide the kind of evidence 
that "tends to skew and corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process." 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988). As Mr. Losee noted in his 
opening brief, such evidence "is objectionable not because it has no 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appreciable probative value but because it has too much." Id. (Citing, with 
approval, 1A J. Wigmore, "Evidence in Trials at Common Law," Section 
58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983).) 
The State argues the trial court was correct when it admitted evidence 
of Mr. Losee's May, 2006 break-in and assault, because such evidence was 
admitted for proper, noncharacter reasons. The trial court focused on 
motive. The state now argues that evidence was properly admitted "to show 
context for the instant crime, to establish motive, and to rebut claims of 
fabrication." Br. Appellee 10. The State also argues the evidence was 
relevant to the case at hand, and that the "probative value of this evidence 
was not substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice." Id. 
Mr. Losee addressed admissibility of the prior crimes evidence in 
detail in his opening brief, and now summarily addresses those issues again, 
focusing on the issues of context and rebuttal, which are raised in Appellee's 
brief. 
Whether evidence of prior bad acts is admissible is subject to rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The rule provides, in relevant part: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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When analyzing whether particular evidence is admissible under rule 
404(b), a court must undertake a three-part analysis. First, the court must 
determine whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose. Second, the court must determine whether such evidence is 
relevant (under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence). Finally, 
the court must determine whether the evidence should be excluded because 
it is more prejudicial than probative (Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence). State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843 (Utah 1999). 
a. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes was not offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose. 
The trial court found Mr. Losee's prior acts were fueled by his 
animosity and extreme emotion toward Ms. Underwood. The trial court also 
found that Mr. Losee's emotion was lingering when Mr. Losee allegedly 
solicited Ms. Underwood's murder some five months later. The trial court 
ruled that Mr. Losee's prior bad acts "establish this emotional motive in a 
way no other evidence available to the State can." Memorandum Decision, 
pp. 4-5. 
However, a focus on Mr. Losee's emotional state during the 
commission of his prior crimes misses the point. As the court in State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), noted, "[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether the other acts have 'clearly probative value with respect to the intent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of the accused at the time of the offense charged"" Id. at 429-30 (citation 
omitted; emphasis in original). Thus, the statements allegedly made by Mr. 
Losee to Mr. Pendleton - "you shouldn't have fucked over the little man" -
are much more relevant to Mr. Losee's state of mind at the time of the 
alleged solicitation than are his presumed state of mind and actions of May, 
2006. 
The State now argues the evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes was 
admissible to give the jury a contextual basis for Mr. Losee's alleged 
solicitation of murder. 
Webster's defines "context" as "the whole situation, background, or 
environment relevant to a particular event." Webster's New World 
Dictionary, 2d College Ed. (1986) (emphasis supplied). The State quotes 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n. 4 (Utah App. 1991), for the 
proposition that evidence of prior crimes is admissible "to paint a picture of 
the context in which events transpired." Br. Appellee 17. The State also 
quotes State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986): "a defendant's prior 
bad acts can be discussed 'to show the general circumstances surrounding' 
the crime at issue" Br. Appellee 17 (emphasis supplied). The Webster's 
formulation of "context" fits neatly with the meaning as used in Morgan and 
Pierce. The focus of an analysis of relevant, admissible contextual 
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information is thus on events surrounding the crime charged, which in this 
case means the events surrounding Mr. Losee's alleged solicitation to 
commit murder. 
To admit evidence of an unrelated, dissimilar heat-of-the-moment act 
such as Mr. Losee's assault and burglary at Ms. Underwood's home five 
months earlier as "context" regarding his alleged cold, calculated contractual 
act of solicitation is the strain beyond recognition the meaning of context. 
Mr. Losee's wildly emotional, horrifying acts in May, 2006 provide 
no context for his alleged solicitation because those acts simply are not 
relevant to, are not part and parcel of, the alleged solicitation five months 
later. To argue evidence of such emotionally driven gunplay, and the 
terrified victim's 9-1-1 call provide context for a months-later calculated, 
contractual arrangement of murder-for-hire is akin to the argument that a 
night of drunken love-making in the spring is the contextual explanation for 
an early-winter marriage proposal. Both the gunplay and the drunken night 
are only tangentially related snapshots that offer no real explanation for the 
contracts proposed months later. 
In discussing Mr. Losee's motives for his alleged solicitation, the 
State argues Mr. Losee "later concluded that his perceived girlfriend had 
betrayed and rejected him when she established a relationship with another 
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man." Br. Appellee 18. This is a motive the State could have pursued to 
explain Mr. Losee's alleged solicitation, the context the State could have 
provided. Such feelings may explain why Mr. Losee would have done what 
the State said he did. But detailed evidence that a highly emotional, perhaps 
drunk, Mr. Losee terrorized the victim five months before his alleged act of 
solicitation of murder does nothing to explain why he might have later 
solicited her death. Evidence of the prior crimes provides no motive or 
context for the solicitation; it only shows he was a bad guy in May. 
Likewise, evidence of his prior crimes does nothing to rebut Mr. 
Losee's claim that the State's chief witness against him - career criminal 
Andre Pendleton - fabricated his testimony for his own benefit. That Mr. 
Pendleton benefitted from his testimony against Mr. Losee is 
uncontroverted. He was booked into jail and charged with first degree 
felony possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in a drug free zone, and 
was allowed to plead to a third degree felony. His deal included release from 
jail to probation upon testifying in Mr. Losee's case. Mr. Pendleton testified 
he received the benefit of his deal. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 60, lines 12-
14; p.73, lines 23-24; p. 79, lines 3-6; and p. 93, line 20 to p. 94, line 22.) 
Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes cannot address Mr. Pendleton's 
motives, cannot do away with the obvious motive of Mr. Pendleton to 
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fabricate a story regarding Mr. Losee, and thereby win his early release. Mr. 
Pendleton is a career criminal, with a vast knowledge of how the justice 
system works, and he sought to take advantage of the system by testifying 
against Mr. Losee. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 73, line 5; p. 74, line 17 to 
p.75, line 16; p. 82, line 6; and p. 92, lines 8-14.) 
To properly address and rebut Mr. Losee's claim that Mr. Pendleton 
made up the solicitation story to essentially obtain his own "Get out of Jail 
Free" card, the State must address Mr. Pendleton's state of mind. The 
veracity of Mr. Pendleton's testimony cannot be verified or supported by 
evidence of Mr. Losee's violent May rampage. It is the behavior of Mr. 
Losee at the time he was allegedly soliciting a murder that must be used by 
the State to support Mr. Pendleton's testimony. 
b. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts is simply not relevant to 
the case at trial. 
The State argues Mr. Losee's prior crimes are relevant to the 
solicitation charge. "Evidence of Defendant's earlier involvement with 
Becky [Underwood] and his past violent acts against her made it more 
probable that he had the motive and intent to solicit her murder. It made it 
more likely that Defendant was not just a random victim of [Mr.] 
Pendleton's retribution." Br. Appellee 20-21. 
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First, it is important to remember that Mr. Losee has never claimed to 
be a "random victim of [Mr.] Pendleton." Instead, Mr. Losee has argued he 
was an easy target for the likes of Mr. Pendleton because of his notoriety. 
His May, 2006 crimes were fodder for the evening news on television, and 
were well-known to the jail population. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 61, lines 
3-24; and p. 84, line 13 to p. 85, line 1.) 
Second, Mr. Losee's prior crimes are simply not relevant to the 
solicitation charge. "[U]nless the other crimes evidence tends to prove some 
fact that is material to the crime charged - other than the defendant's 
propensity to commit crime - it is irrelevant and should be excluded by the 
court pursuant to rule 402." Decorso, at 844. " 'Relevant evidence' means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Mr. Losee was on trial for his alleged solicitation of Ms. Underwood's 
murder sometime in the fall of 2006, not his aggravated burglary and 
aggravated assault which occurred in May, 2006. The earlier events have no 
bearing on the State's proof of the elements of the solicitation of murder 
charge. To be guilty of solicitation, a defendant must (1) intend that a felony 
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be committed when he (2) solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or 
importunes another (3) to engage in specific conduct the defendant believes 
would be a felony. Utah Code Ann. 76-4-203(1) (1993). Furthermore, the 
solicitation must be "made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the 
[defendant's] intent that the offense be committed. Utah Code Ann. 76-4-
203(2) (1993). 
The events of May, 2006 simply do not have any tendency to make 
more probable any fact that is of consequence to the solicitation charge. Mr. 
Losee's earlier crimes do not have any bearing on what he allegedly did 
while he sat in jail during the fall of 2006, and they can shed no light on 
whether or not he believed he was asking Mr. Pendleton commit a felony. 
Thus, the facts surrounding Mr. Losee's prior crimes of May, 2006 are not 
relevant, and are not admissible under rule 402. 
c. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts is prejudicial, and that 
prejudice substantially outweighs any probative value to the 
State's solicitation case. 
Mr. Losee addresses the prejudicial nature of the prior crimes 
evidence at greater length in his opening brief. This section addresses the 
State's contention that the probative value is not substantially outweighed by 
the prejudice suffered by Mr. Losee. 
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Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible if it is "substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury." Decorso, at 844. Furthermore, 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of 
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as 
to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility. 
Id., quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (emphasis 
supplied). 
It is undeniable that the evidence is strong regarding Mr. Losee's prior 
bad acts of May, 2006. Mr. Losee eventually pleaded guilty to crimes of 
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault that arose from the May 
incident. Some of his most outrageous behavior was recorded in the 9-1-1 
call made by Ms. Underwood. His behavior was witnessed by police. 
However, under the analysis of both Shickles and State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 
1139 (Utah App. 2002), (which follows Shickles), even where there is strong 
proof of the prior crime, prior crimes evidence also must be strongly 
probative of the defendant's intent to commit the latter crime which is the 
subject at trial. Here, evidence of Mr. Losee's prior aggravated burglary and 
aggravated assault is not probative of his intent to commit the charged crime 
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of solicitation of murder. Without such a connection, evidence of his prior 
crimes is inadmissible. (See, discussion of Shickles factors four and five, 
below.) 
Furthermore, this factor is but one of six. When analyzing the second 
Shickles factor the trial court assessed "commonality" instead of the 
similarities between the two criminal episodes. 
Mr. Losee's prior crimes and the crime at trial are dissimilar as two 
crimes can be. It is not enough to conclude, as the trial court did, "that these 
separate crimes were perpetrated against the same victim, for arguably a 
common reason and outcome [, thus] completing] the commonality 
element." Memorandum Decision at 7. In Decorso the similarity relied on 
was the court's earlier finding that the prior crime and the instant crime were 
so alike as to be "signature-like." Id. at 845. In Bradley, the court found "a 
significant similarity between" the prior sex abuse crimes against a different 
victim, who was a sibling to the victims in the instant trial, and "those 
perpetrated against" those sibling victims. Id. at 1147. That finding was 
based upon the defendant's use of "a similar methodology and plan" in 
abusing both prior and current victims. Id. 
As these cases make clear, to support admission of prior bad acts, the 
instant crime and the prior bad acts must be so strikingly similar in nature 
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that evidence of the former is evidence of the latter. There is simply no such 
similarity between Mr. Losee's prior acts and his alleged solicitation of 
murder. 
The prior crime was a crime of extreme emotion, occurring in an 
impassioned and drunken state without any clearheaded forethought. There 
most certainly was not any of the deliberate and calculating effort to commit 
a murder that is the hallmark of solicitation. Solicitation regards a business-
like, contractual arrangement which requires much thought and planning 
before it can be consummated. 
Third, the interval of time elapsed between Mr. Losee's first criminal 
episodes and the alleged solicitation of murder at issue in this trial, 
minimizes the value of the prior crimes evidence. The five months that 
elapsed between Mr. Losee's violent, frightening May, 2006 outburst and 
the alleged quiet, business-like solicitation of September sap the former of 
any reasonable relationship to the latter. As already noted above, the 
Featherson court weighed in on this very issue: "The relevant inquiry is 
whether the other acts have 'clearly probative value with respect to the intent 
of the accused at the time of the offense charged'" Id. at 430 (emphasis in 
original). Thus, it doesn't matter so much how much time has passed, as 
how that time has passed. 
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As noted by the Bradley court, "proximity in time [combined with] 
similarity" to the prior bad acts make evidence of the prior acts "highly 
probative." Id. at 1147. Here, no such link exists. Time has severed almost 
completely the prior crimes from the charged crime. There is no common 
scheme between the prior crimes and the charged crime; there are precious 
few common facts between the prior crime and the charged crime (the key 
victim is the same); there is no relationship between the alleged motives 
(drunken jealousy vs. revenge); the intent is different (angrily and 
emotionally terrorizing a victim he "loves" vs. killing a victim with whom 
Mr. Losee's relationship has been severed); one is an emotional crime of 
opportunity, while the other is a crime of preparation and planning. 
The State argues five months is a period short enough to support the 
admission of evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes. But the cases relied on 
by the State all deal with similarly executed crimes, such that the 
commission of the second is so like the commission of the first that evidence 
of the similarities between the crimes can be used to show method or intent 
or lack of consent. No such similarities tie Mr. Losee's May crimes to his 
alleged September solicitation. 
Fourth, the prosecution did not need the evidence of Mr. Losee's prior 
crimes to try to prove the solicitation charge. Where "[t]here was sufficient 
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evidentiary proof to show that all the elements of the charged crimes had 
been satisfied[,] [introduction of all prior misconduct and convictions was 
unnecessary." Featherson at 431. 
Here, the State could show sufficient facts to make out the elements of 
the charged crime of solicitation of murder. Mr. Pendleton provided 
testimony regarding Mr. Losee's intent that Ms. Underwood be murdered. 
Mr. Pendleton also provided testimony that Mr. Losee solicited him to kill 
Ms. Underwood, or find somebody else to hire to kill her. Mr. Pendleton's 
testimony could be used by the State to show the solicitation of Ms. 
Underwood's murder was made under circumstances strongly corroborative 
of Mr. Losee's intent the murder actually be consummated. The map Mr. 
Pendleton produced also supports the State's case on the elements of 
solicitation. 
Fifth, the court is required to look into the efficacy of the alternative 
proof. As discussed above, the alternative proof available to the State is 
enough to make out the elements of the case. The trial court failed to 
explore the State's need for prior crimes evidence, or the efficacy of that 
alternative evidence to the State's case. This failure to address the issue of 
alternative evidence is, accordingly, a failure to meet its mandate to 
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"scrupulously examine" the admissibility of prior crimes evidence. See 
Decorso, at 843. 
Further, the requirement that the availability and efficacy of 
alternative evidence be explored by the trial court when assessing the 
admissibility of prior crimes evidence cannot mean the State is entitled to 
that evidence simply because it doesn't have a good case without it. That 
would make the prohibition of unfairly prejudicial evidence a barren 
prohibition at best. 
There is alternative proof in the solicitation case against Mr. Losee. 
The State may have been unsure of its alternative proof against Mr. Losee 
because, after all, its evidence comes primarily from a jailhouse snitch who 
had much to gain. But any perceived weaknesses in the State's solicitation 
case against Mr. Losee should not allow the State to essentially retry him for 
the prior crimes. This is exactly the kind of intermingling of prior and instant 
case that "tends to skew and corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding 
process." Shickles, supra. 
Under the final Decorso factor, the trial court was to have explored 
the degree to which evidence of Mr. Loseefs prior acts would "rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility" toward Mr. Losee. The court failed to 
scrupulously explore this issue, superficially noting that while Mr. Losee's 
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actions of May, 2006 "were undeniably extreme ... these acts were no less 
extreme than the actions which led to the charge of Solicitation to Commit 
Aggravated Murder." Memorandum Decision, at 7. 
Without explanation, the State parrots this reasoning in its brief. The 
State goes on to argue that Jury Instruction No. 34 was sufficiently limiting 
to cure the overmastering hostility likely produced by the evidence of Mr. 
Losee's May tirade, and the corresponding prejudice that resulted against 
him. But this reasoning begs the question, "If Mr. Losee's May crimes were 
so outrageous as to rouse the jury to overmastering hostility toward him, 
wouldn't that hostility also overmaster Instruction No. 34?" The answer, of 
course, is a resounding, "Yes!" Once the jury's hostility is unleashed, any 
attempt to limit and control that hostility through a curative instruction is 
likely futile. In May, Mr. Losee shot several times through Ms. 
Underwood's front door, eventually held her hostage, threatened to kill her 
using the most abusive and vulgar language, and fired a round over her head 
while close enough to produce powder bums on her head. Inflammatory 
evidence of such over-the-top behavior, once presented to the jury via 
playing of a video newscast and audio 9-1-1 tape, simply could not and 
would not be ignored by a jury. 
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To deny the prejudicial effect of Mr. Losee's criminal acts of May, 
2006, is to look at those actions while wearing blinders. Mr. Losee's 
frightening acts of May, 2006 reflected little or nothing on his state of mind 
at the time of his alleged solicitation for murder, and evidence of those acts 
clearly would have provoked an emotional response from the jury, arousing 
its instinct to punish or otherwise diverting the jury from the task of 
determining Mr. Losee's mental state at the time of the alleged solicitation 
of murder. See, State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989). See also, State v. 
Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691 (Mont. 1978) (admission into evidence of the 
harrowing audiotape of a rape victim's 9-1-1 call was reversible error in 
violation of rule 403). 
The prejudice to Mr. Losee by admission of evidence regarding his 
prior crimes substantially outweighs the minimal probative value the 
evidence had to the solicitation charge against Mr. Losee. 
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i 
n. A BRIEF NOTE ABOUT PLAIN ERROR AND THE 
SETTLED NATURE OF THE LAW OF YATES AND 
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS 
(OR, WHY, EVEN IF THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE IS 
UPHELD, MR. LOSEE IS ENTITLED TO THE LESSER 
SECOND DEGREE PENALTY AFFORDED BY THE 
AMENDED AGGRAVATAED MURDER STATUTE). 
Mr. Losee addressed the sentencing issues in detail in his opening 
brief, but now takes the opportunity afforded here to respond briefly to the 
issues raised by the State in its brief. 
Mr. Losee asserts that because the legislature amended the aggravated 
murder statute after Mr. Losee's offense, but prior to his sentencing, he is 
entitled to the lesser penalty afforded by the amended statute, which 
rendered his offense a second degree felony. Mr. Losee asserts this is true 
even though his counsel failed to raise this sentencing issue below. This 
court can address the matter of Mr. Losee9 s sentencing because the failure of 
the trial court to make the proper sentence under applicable law is plain 
error. 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the [outcome] is undermined. 
State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). 
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The State asserts Mr. Losee is not entitled to the sentence required for 
a second degree felony conviction because the State claims the error was not 
obvious. Mr. Losee "points to no settled appellate precedent requiring a 
court to impose a lesser sentence than that sentence mandated both at the 
time of the crime's commission and at the time of sentencing." Br. Appellee 
34-35. This argument attempts to divert this Court's attention from the 
obvious: both the law of State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1996) and 
the prohibition against the imposition of ex post facto punishments are long-
settled propositions that apply to the courts and laws of this state. 
Although Yates was decided in 1996, its ruling rested on long-
standing law in Utah: 
Defendants are entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty afforded by 
an amended statute made effective prior to their sentencing. Belt v. 
Turner, 483 P.2d 425, 426 (1971). The Utah Supreme Court 
articulated this principle twenty-five years ago: "A new policy having 
been adopted by the legislature concerning the punishment for the 
offense we are here concerned with ... should inure to the defendant's 
benefit even though the offense had been committed and the plea 
thereto made prior to the amendatory legislation." Id. The Supreme 
Court has subsequently affirmed a defendant's right to a lesser 
sentence when the legislature reduces the penalty for the crime 
charged in the interim between commission of the offense and 
sentencing. Additionally, the criminal code itself suggests defendants 
are entitled to any lesser penalties that the legislature has determined 
appropriate for their crimes: Any offense committed prior to the 
effective date of this code shall be governed by the law, statutory and 
non-statutory, existing at the time of commission thereof, except that 
a defense or limitation on punishment available under this code shall 
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be available to any defendant tried or retried after the effective date. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-103(2) (1995). 
(emphasis in original) (some citations omitted). 
Mr. Losee was charged November 13, 2006 by information with one 
count of Solicitation to Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder, a 
First Degree Felony. The allegation remained the same when an Amended 
Information was filed December 19, 2006, and a Second Amended 
Information was filed April 1, 2008, on the first day of trial. 
The aggravated murder statute under which Mr. Losee was originally 
charged defined aggravated murder as a "capital felony." Utah Code Ann. 
76-5-202(2) (2005). The criminal solicitation statute in effect at the time of 
Mr. Losee's alleged offense described the penalty to be applied to Mr. 
Losee's crime: "Criminal solicitation to commit... a capital felony is a first 
degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(1) (1990). The aggravated 
murder statute was amended in 2007. That amendment created two 
definitions of aggravated murder. Under the first definition, it remained a 
capital offense. Under the definition applicable to Mr. Losee's offense, 
aggravated murder became "a noncapital first degree felony." Utah Code 
Ann. 76-5-202(3)(a)&(b) (2007).1 Because of the amendment to the 
1
 The relevant language of the amended statute is: (a) If a notice of intent to 
seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
aggravated murder statute, Mr. Losee's crime became a first degree felony 
that was reclassified under the solicitation statute as "a first degree felony is 
a second degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(2) (1990). 
Because the limitation on punishment was effective before Mr. Losee 
was tried, he was entitled to be sentenced for a second degree felony. This 
remains true even though the criminal solicitation statute itself was amended 
and again, by the time Mr. Losee was sentenced, classified Mr. Losee's 
alleged solicitation as a first degree felony. Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(1 )(a) 
(2008). 
This is so because of the prohibition against the imposition of ex post 
facto laws that increase punishment. Because application of the amended 
criminal solicitation statute to Mr. Losee's case would increase his 
punishment, it violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws found in the 
Utah and United States constitutions. U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 10; and 
Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 18. What this means was explained by the Utah 
Supreme Court more than 25 years ago: "An ex post facto law is one that 
punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which ... makes more 
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed, 
aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for life without parole or by an indeterminate term of not less 
than 20 years and which may be for life." No notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty was ever filed in Mr. Losee's case. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission." State v. 
Norton, 675 P. 2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
Because the amended aggravated murder statute afforded Mr. Losee a 
lesser penalty, the later amendment to the criminal solicitation statute was 
one that made "more burdensome the punishment" for Mr. Losee's crime. 
Thus, the April 2008 amendment to criminal solicitation statute is barred by 
the prohibition against ex post facto laws from being applied to Mr. Losee's 
sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to 
reverse the jury's finding Appellant was guilty of First Degree Solicitation to 
Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder. In the alternative, if the 
verdict is upheld, Appellant asks this Court to remand his case for 
sentencing as a second degree felony as mandated by the amended 
aggravated murder statute. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 2011. 
Robert L. Donohoe 
Attorney for Appellant 
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